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1. Introduction
Although the proliferation of the Internet and
communication technology have facilitated many aspects 
of our daily life and the way we conduct business in the 
modern economy, they brought several difficulties and 
threats as well. Malicious software, also called malware is 
one of these threats that puts many systems and 
cyberspace resources at risk [1]. The attackers and 
malware developers have created many variants of 
malware to evade existing security measures and avoid 
the detection. Consequently, many types of malware such 
as Viruses, Trojans, Worms, and Ransomware have been 
seen in the wild. Motivated by the financial revenue, 
malware developers have introduced the extortion 
concept into cyberspace world by creating Ransomware. 
Since its first occurrence on late 1980s, Ransomware has 
become a major threat that compromises the accessibility, 
integrity and confidentiality of user and business data and 
resources [2]. Enabled by Ransomware-as-a-Service 
(RaaS), Cryptography and Cyber-currency technologies, 
the rate of ransomware attacks have increased 
dramatically in recent years [1, 3-6]. 
Ransomware is categorized into two main types, viz. 
Scareware and detrimental Ransomware [1]. The former 
is fake warnings that mimics anti-virus software and send 
false allegations to threaten the victim while latter is a 
real threat which leverages several system utilities to 
mount the digital extortion against the victims [1, 7-9]. 
Furthermore, detrimental ransomware is categorized into 
two types, i.e. Crypto-Ransomware (CRW) and Locker-
Ransomware (LRW). CRW leverages the cryptography 
functions in the host operating system to encrypt user-
related files. On the other hand, LRW locks and/or 
disables some operating system functions such as 
desktop, applications and input/output utilities [1, 7].  
Several studies have been conducted to propose 
CRW detection solutions. Ahmadian, et al. [10] adopted 
the signature-based approach to detect the Domain 
Generation Algorithm (DGA) strings in the ransomware 
payload. This approach depends on the static analysis by 
Abstract: Crypto-ransomware employs the cryptography to lock user personal files and demands ransom to 
release them. By utilizing several technological utilities like cyber-currency and cloud-based developing platforms, 
crypto-ransomware has gained high popularity among adversaries. Motivated by the monetary revenue, crypto-
ransomware developers continuously produce many variants of such malicious programs to evade the detection. 
Consequently, the rate of crypto-ransomware novel attacks is continuously increasing. As such, it is imperative for 
detection solutions to be able to discover these novel attacks, also called zero-day attacks. While anomaly 
detection-based solutions are able to deal with this problem, they suffer the high rate of false alarms. Thus, this 
paper puts forward a detection model that incorporates anomaly with behavioral detection approaches. In this 
model, two types of detection estimators were built. The first type is an ensemble of behavioral-based classifiers 
whereas the second type is an anomaly-based estimator. The decisions of both types of estimators were combined 
using fusion technique. The proposed model is able to detect the novel attack while maintaining low false alarms 
rate. By applying the proposed model, the detection rate was increased from 96% to 99% and the false positive rate 
was as low as 2.4 %. 
Keywords: Crypto-ransomware; malware; anomaly detection; Cryptography; Ensemble learning 
*Corresponding author: bnder321@gmail.com
2018 UTHM Publisher. All right reserved. 
penerbit.uthm.edu.my/ojs/index.php/ijie 
82 
B.A.S. Al-rimy et al., Int. J. Of Integrated Engineering: Special Issue 2018: Data Information Engineering: Vol. 10 No. 6 (2018) p. 82-88 
which, the ransomware source code was introspected to 
extract the structural patterns, i.e. static signature that 
distinguish ransomware from benign programs. Likewise, 
Andronio, et al. [11] employed the static analysis to look 
for the threatening text in the payload of the program 
under analysis which is; if found; a strong indicator of the 
maliciousness of that program. Similarly, several static 
features like the imported libraries, functions, and file 
extensions were utilized by Sgandurra, et al. [12] for 
crypto-ransomware early detection. However, static 
analysis is not suitable for early detection as it inspects 
the payload of the ransomware without executing it 
whereas early detection depends on the runtime 
information at the initial phases of the attack[1]. 
Additionally, like any malware; CRW employs several 
obfuscation and packing techniques that changes the 
patterns with each infection to prevent and/or evade the 
detection [13] which renders the static-based detection 
not effective. 
Kharraz, et al. [4] proposed dynamic-based detection 
system called UNVEIL which observes the program’s 
behavior based on data from several sources such as 
CPU, memory, I/O buffer. Similarly, Song, et al. [14] 
used the data gathered from CPU, memory, and file 
events during the runtime of the process in question in 
Android systems and extracted the dynamic patterns that 
distinguish ransomware from other processes. 
Furthermore, honeypot approach was employed by Cabaj, 
et al. [15] to inspect the ransomware communication 
behavior and infection chain. Entropy was adopted by 
Kharraz, et al. [4], Mbol, et al. [16] to measure the 
difference in the data in I/O buffer before and after 
access. The higher entropy difference, the higher 
possibility that the data have undergone encryption which 
might be carried out by ransomware. 
The irreversible effect of CRW attack entails that 
such attack needs to be detected early, i.e. before CRW 
starts encrypting the files. Several studies proposed early 
detection solution for CRW attacks. Sgandurra, et al. [12] 
built machine learning-based detection model for CRW 
early detection. A logistic regression classifier was 
trained by the data extracted from the first 30 seconds of 
CRW runtime. This data includes API calls, files, 
directories and registry keys operations. The same 
approach was adopted by Homayoun, et al. [17]. They 
reduced the runtime period into 10 seconds. Then the 
collected data was used to train ensemble of classifiers 
using Bagging and Random Forest. However, the 
detection models that have been proposed in those studies 
are misuse-based. That is, they have built the detection 
models based on CRW known patterns. Such approach 
fails when encountering new attacks whose patterns were 
not known to the detection model. These attacks are 
called novel or zero-day attacks. In the same time, 
accounting on anomaly detection only renders the 
detection solution vulnerable to high rate of false alarms. 
Therefore, there is a need for detection solutions that 
detect the novel attacks while maintaining low rate of 
false alarms. To the best of our knowledge, there is no 
study that tackles such integration for CRW detection. To 
this end, this study fills this gap and puts forward the 
integration between the anomaly and behavioral 
approaches for CRW detection. By incorporating the 
behavioral-based approach into the anomaly-based 
model, the proposed solution addresses the limitation of 
the anomaly detection-based model and decreases the 
false alarms rate. In our previous study, Al-rimy, et al. 
[3], we proposed a framework for the integration between 
anomaly and behavioral approaches to detect CRW 
attacks. In this study, we extend that work and build an 
early detection solution by utilizing the APIs generated 
during the first five second of CRW runtime period and 
build a hybrid detection solution that combines the 
anomaly and behavioral models for CRW early detection. 
To enhance the detection performance, the proposed 
solution employs ensemble learning techniques to train 
group of classifiers on different data subsets. In addition, 
the anomaly-based estimator was trained on the entire 
benign programs dataset and fused into the ensemble 
using OR logic. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study that introduces the integration between the 
anomaly and behavioral approach for CRW early 
detection. Such integration guarantees that the proposed 
detection model is able to detect novel CRW attacks 
while maintaining low false alarms rate. The rest of this 
paper is organized as follows. In section 2 methodology 
of this study is detailed. Results and discussion are 
presented in Section 3. Then, the paper is concluded by 
Section 4. 
 
2. The Methodology 
The proposed model combines two detection 
approaches, behavioral and anomaly detection. The 
behavioral detection was built using the ensemble 
learning. That is, several classifiers were trained on the 
behavioral dataset and constitute the base estimators. The 
decision of those estimators were combined using the 
majority voting strategy. On the other hand, the anomaly 
detection model was built and trained on the benign 
dataset. Unlike the behavioral detection model, the 
anomaly detection model is a single classifier. The 
combination between the decision of both behavioral and 
anomaly based detection models was carried out using the 
decision fusion technique. This section elaborates the 
methodology employed by this study and discusses the 
design of the proposed model. 
 
2.1 Preprocessing 
A corpus of crypto-ransomware samples downloaded 
from virsushare.com public repository was used to 
conduct the experiments of this study. Additionally, 
benign programs were downloaded from informer.com, a 
well-known windows applications repository [13, 18, 19]. 
Then, both types of programs, i.e. ransomware and benign 
were undergone dynamic analysis in a controlled 
environment. The analysis environment was built using 
Cuckoo Sandbox, a well-known and widely-used analysis 
platform [20] by which each instance was run for 5 
seconds. Then, the runtime data for all instances were 
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dumped into trace files such that each instance has its own 
trace file. Fig. 1 shows the flow pre-processing phase. 
 
CRW Corpus Benign Programs Corpus
Run the sample
Runtime Data 
Acquisition
Dataset
APIs Capturing
 
 
Fig. 1: Pre-processing phase. 
 
The data includes Application Programming Interface 
API calls that were used by the running program to 
interact with the underlying operating system along with 
the timestamp that represent the time by when these APIs 
were called.  Then, the API calls of each trace file were 
sorted ascendingly, i.e. from the newest to the oldest 
according to the time stamp. 
 
2.2 Features Extraction 
To extract the features that represent the dataset, 1-
gram, a variant of the commonly used n-gram technique 
was employed. That is, each API was treated as one 
feature. These features are called API-gram features. 
Then, the Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency 
(TF-IDF) was utilized to calculate the weight of each API 
[21] based on (1).  
( ) ( ) ( )
logk k
k
Nw x tf x
idf x
= ⋅     (1)
 
w(xk) is the API weight, N is the total number of instances 
in the dataset, xk is the  kth feature in the instance, tf 
calculates frequency the feature xk that was called by a 
particular instance and idf determines how many instances 
called a that specific feature xk at least once. For each 
instance, TF-IDF built a feature vector Vi which were used 
as input for the learning algorithm at both training and 
testing phases. 
 
2.3 Features Selection 
The usage of n-gram technique to extract the features 
generates a high dimensional features space which affects 
the estimators’ accuracy and renders them vulnerable to 
overfitting. As such, the Mutual Information (MI) was 
adopted to select the distinguishing features of the 
dataset. MI utilizes the entropy measurement to assess the 
amount of information each feature carries about the class 
label. The calculation of entropy was carried out using 
(2). 
( ) ( ) ( )2
0
log
N
i i i
i
H x p x p x
=
= −∑    (2) 
where p(xi) is the probability density function (PDF) of 
the feature xi and N is the number of features. Then, MI 
was calculated according to (3). 
 
( ; ) ( ) ( | )MI X Y H Y H Y X= −    (3) 
 
2.4 Training/Testing 
After extracting the API-gram features and 
calculating TF-IDF weights, the dataset was split into two 
parts, i.e. training set and testing set. The size of raining 
set is 70 % and testing set is 30%. In addition, the benign 
set which contains data from benign programs only was 
created as well. The training set was used to build the 
estimators of module 1 while the benign set was used to 
build the anomaly-based estimator. After training, the 
performance of base estimators as well as entire ensemble 
was validated using the 10-fold cross-validation 
technique. 
 
2.5 Designing the Proposed Model 
To boost the detection accuracy, the proposed 
ensemble consists of n estimators each of which was 
trained on different data subset. These subsets were 
selected according to bootstrap aggregation (bagging) 
technique. That is, the subsets were built by randomly 
choosing group of instances with replacement for each 
subset. This leads to different data subsets and thus, 
different models [22]. The number of instances are equal 
for all subsets. Additionally, the sampling is stratified, i.e. 
the benign-to-ransomware ratio of each subset is 
maintained and consistent with that of the original 
dataset. Then, each data subset was used to train one base 
estimator. 
 
A) Ensemble-Based Behavioral Model (BE) 
In this type, one classification algorithm was used to 
build homogenous base estimators. Particularly, Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) was employed to build these 
estimators as it proved its efficacy and powerful 
generalization capability in many machine learning tasks 
including malware detection [23, 24]. For binary 
classification, SVM constructs a hyperplane which 
maximizes the margin that separates the two classes. 
Intuitively, a good separation is achieved by finding a 
hyperplane with the largest functional margin, i.e. the 
distance to the nearest data points of any class [25]. As 
such, the generalization error is inversely proportional to 
the functional margin. For such separation, SVM employs 
the kernel function technique that transforms the original 
data into high dimensional feature space [26].  The 
formula (4) is used for SVM classification [27]: 
( ) ( ), xi i i
i SV
h x sign y K x bα
∈
 
= + 
 
∑    (4) 
where SV are the support vectors, K(xi , x) is the kernel 
function, x is the features vector of the input sample,  xi 
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the ith feature in the vector x, α is the lagrange multiplier 
that determines the parameters w, b of the maximal 
margin classifier. The detection result P(x) is ransomware 
(rw) if the h(x) is positive, i.e. h(x) > 0, and benign 
otherwise as illustrated by (5). 
( ) ( )( )
,               0
,       0
rw h x
P x
benign h x
 <=  ≥
    (5) 
 
The decision of SVM base estimators were combined 
using majority voting scheme as it is simple and straight 
forward. Particularly, each base estimator got one vote, 
either rw or benign. These votes were calculated and the 
class label that have at least one more than half votes 
won. Fig. 2 illustrates the design of the ensemble. Testing 
error curve was utilized to determine the number of 
estimators such that the detection error is minimum. Due 
to space limitation of this paper, we do not elaborate on 
the process of choosing the optimal number of base 
estimators. However, it turned out that n=3 gives 
comparable detection rate. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Behavioral-based ensemble model 
 
B) Anomaly-Based Estimator 
To detect zero-day, i.e. novel ransomware attacks; an 
anomaly based estimator were built using One-Class 
SVM (OC-SVM) algorithm. In this algorithm, the 
training data has only one type of samples. These samples 
were benign programs such that the estimator represents 
the normal behavior. Any deviation from the normal 
reference is considered anomaly, i.e. ransomware. OC-
SVM determines a hyper sphere of minimum volume that 
covers all the training points [28]. Unlike CRW behavior 
that could be separated into multiple regions based on the 
malicious family which make it easy to build multiple 
classifiers on smaller subsets, the boundaries of the 
behavior of benign programs have no such separation. As 
such, we opted to represent these benign programs by 
only one anomaly estimator. 
 
 
 
C) Decision Fusion 
The decision of the anomaly estimator is then fused 
with the vote result of the homogenous ensemble using 
OR logic. That is, if any or both decisions was 
ransomware, then the final decision is ransomware. 
Otherwise, the decision is benign as (6). 
 
( ) ( )1 21 2
1,           , 1
, 
0,           
any m m
D m m
otherwise
 =
= 

  (6) 
m1, m2 are the homogenous ensemble and anomaly 
estimator respectively. D(m1, m2) is the decision fusion. 
Fig. 3 shows the pseudo code for decision fusion. Fig. 4 
illustrates the combination of the ensemble model with 
the anomaly estimator. 
 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
In this section, we evaluate the proposed method 
experimentally. The proposed method was evaluated 
against four performance metrics, i.e. accuracy, F1-
measure (F1), Detection Rate (DR) and False Positive 
(FP) alarms. Furthermore, a comparison was conducted 
between the proposed method and two base-line methods, 
i.e. Logistic Regression and SVM. In addition, the 
comparison was carried out between the proposed method 
before fusion (BE) and after fusion (FDE). 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Pseudo Code of the Decision fusion 
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CRW Dataset
Behavioral 
estimator1
Behavoral 
estimator2
Behavioral 
estimator n
Anomaly 
estimator
Voting
……...
End
Start
Decision Fusion
Final Decision
 
 
Fig. 4: The combination of behavioral and anomaly 
estimators in the ensemble. 
 
 
3.1 The Experimental Environment Setup 
The experiments were conducted on an Intel(R) 
Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60 GHZ and 16 GB RAM. 
The Cuckoo Sandbox analysis platform were installed on 
Linux ubuntu 4.4.0-59-generic with MS Windows XP 
Professional SP3 guest machine. The ensemble estimators 
and results analysis were implemented using Python 
libraries including Sklearn, Pandas and Numpy. CRW 
and benign programs were run in one by one. After each 
run, the gust machine was restored into the original, clean 
state. Extracted data was gathered and the features were 
extracted and selected during the preprocessing phase. 
Once ready, the dataset was used to train the detection 
model. 
 
3.2 Dataset 
The corpus of crypto-ransomware binaries used in 
this study were downloaded from virusshare.com public 
repository [12, 13, 18, 19]. The corpus consists of 38,152 
samples. These samples represent different families such 
as Cerber, TeslaCrypt, CryptoWall, Petya and WannaCry. 
Those samples were collected during the period from Sep 
2016 to Aug 2017. In addition, 1000 benign programs 
were downloaded from informer.com [12, 19, 29, 30], a 
popular Windows-based applications repository. For the 
purpose of this study, the collected ransomware corpus 
was divided into two sets, training set and holdout set. 
The sampling was carried out so that the training set 
contains 90% of the samples whereas holdout set contains 
10%. The training set was used to train, validate and test 
the performance of the detection model using 10-fold 
cross validation. Holdout set contained crypto-
ransomware samples that have not been previously seen 
or used in any training-validation-testing process at the 
time the model was built. So, crypto-ransomware 
instances in the holdout represent the zero-day attacks. 
The purpose of such division is to determine how 
accurate the detection model in detecting the new 
ransomware samples. Then, both ransomware and benign 
programs were run in the sandbox. After submitting the 
sample to the analyzing machine, the sandbox agent in 
the guest machine hooks the process created by that 
sample and captures the APIs along with the parameters 
and dumps them into a trace file in the host machine 
specified for that sample. These files constitute the corpus 
by which the dataset was built and the features were 
extracted and selected. 
 
 
3.3 Experimental Results 
Fig. 5 shows that the FDE method surpassed the 
other three methods. Similarly, Table 1 shows that FDE 
outperformed the homogenous ensemble in three 
measurements, i.e. accuracy, DR and F1 while BE gave 
lower FP rate than FDE. Equations (7,8,9,10) calculate 
the F-Measure (F1), accuracy (acc), DR and FP 
measurements respectively.  
2* *1 Precision RecallF
Precision Recall
=
+
   (7) 
TP TNacc
TP TN FP FN
+
=
+ + +
   (8) 
TPDR
TP FN
=
+
     (9) 
FPFPR
FP TN
=
+
                                  (10)   
From the results, it can be observed that using 
ensemble of estimators enhanced the detection 
performance in terms of the detection accuracy, F1-
measure, detection rate and false positive rate. 
Additionally, fusing the anomaly-based approach with the 
behavioral-based approach increased the detection rate 
from 0.96 to 0.99. However, the false positive rate of the 
FDE method increased. The reason is that the anomaly-
based estimator generated high false alarms which 
generally one of the main limitations of this approach. 
Such high rate of false alarms is because the anomaly 
approach builds the normal profile based on the 
behavioral aspects of the benign programs. However, the 
normal behavior is so diverse due to the large number of 
benign applications which is difficult to include in single 
profile. Therefore, the anomaly based detection suffers 
the high rate of the false alarms as mentioned in Section 
1.  
To measure the superiority of the ensemble-based 
method (BE) to detect zero-day attacks, the detection 
performance of the method was compared with the 
anomaly-based model in terms of F1-measure, accuracy, 
precision and recall. The experiments were carried out 
using the holdout set. Table 2 suggests that the BE 
outperformed the anomaly-based model in detecting the 
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zero-day attacks thanks to the high accuracy of the 
ensemble learning approach due to the diversity of its 
base estimators. Such diversity was achieved by using 
heterogeneous base estimators when building the 
detection model. To determine the degree of significance 
of the enhancement, t-test was conducted with a threshold 
adjusted at the standard value 0.05. The p-value was 
0.0473 which is less than the threshold. This suggests that 
the improvement was significant.  
 
 
 
Fig. 5: Comparison between the proposed model with 
related work. 
 
Table 1: Comparison between the detection performances 
of the proposed model and the behavioral approach. 
 
 FDE BE 
Accuracy 0.97717 0.9757489 
F1 0.986971 0.986122 
DR 0.99 0.9638 
FP 0.0242 0.02265 
 
 
Table 2: Comparison between the detection performances 
of the proposed model and the anomaly approach. 
 
 BE Anomaly 
F1 0.995066 0.942771 
Accuracy 0.991441 0.891738 
Precision 0.993432 1 
Recall 0.996705 0.891738 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we proposed an ensemble fusion 
method for crypto-ransomware early detection. This 
method combines estimators of anomaly and behavioral 
approaches to detect novel attacks and maintaining low 
rate of false alarms. The proposed method combines the 
homogenous estimators using majority voting while fuses 
anomaly and behavioral estimators using OR logic. This 
method achieved 99% detection rate and 2.4% false 
positive alarms on a real world dataset with more than 
12000 applications. These results show that the proposed 
method is effective crypto-ransomware early detection 
solution. Such model can be applied on different 
platforms like PC, mobile and IoT devices. One limitation 
of the proposed model is the reliance on fixed time-based 
threshold to define the early phase of ransomware attacks. 
To overcome such limitation, we are currently working 
on building detection technique that defines the early 
phase of the attack dynamically based on the behavioral 
information of the crypto-ransomware sample. 
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